Secondly, before debating the question of proportionality, the trouble is in defining what constitutes military advantage. It seems that all the military goals can only be defined in terms of the consequences they are intended to achieve over a prolonged period long after the initial period of active combat is over. If the test of proportionality is based on the purpose of these attacks, it is on stronger ground but if it is to be judged by the actual consequences, it is more debatable.

Firstly, the trained manpower of a terrorist organization is usually large compared to the size of their organizational structure. So leaders at every level are easily and quickly replaced in the event of their death. So what is the military objective of killing these individuals? Presumably the hope that it will lead to loss of morale throughout the organization, the replacements will carry less influence over the foot soldiers/donors and the organization will fracture with splinter groups carrying a diminished ability to attack. Will any of this actually happen? Nobody knows.

Likewise, with arms smuggling. These arms smuggling tunnels if destroyed, being anything but sophisticated, are easily rebuilt as well. So if the objective is to follow up their destruction with a monitoring effort to prevent them from being rebuilt, one does not know how feasible it is though the death of civilians in the process might be more acceptable than if the objective is simply achieving a temporary respite till they are rebuilt.

The only destruction that carries a sustained impact is that of governmental infrastructure which is expensive and not quickly reconstructed. But what is the objective that its destruction is expected to advance? The emergence of anarchy? The opportunity to replace the current crop of officials with a new bunch whose ideological motivations will presumably be different and enable them to stop these rocket attacks? If it is the latter, how does Israel expect to achieve it? That is not so clear.

In each of these cases, how many collateral civilian deaths would be considered acceptable for every assassination of a single Hamas operative or the destruction of a cache of arms or the blowing up of a government building? 1? 10? 50? 100? In a densely populated region, one cannot expect to achieve any of this without some degree of civilian damage. These are unfortunately the very sort of questions that any government confronting a terrorist menace will have to deal with (including India if it ever plans to use military force).

A lot of the criticism comes not from the attack itself, but the recklessness with which it is being carried out.