Something About The Law

Below is a short version of my Speech for the Constitutional Law Society’s debate on The Collegium, Judges Assets and Justice Dinakaran. It was a laudable effort on the part of the CLS to organise the same and kudos to them.

In the Second Judges case, Verma J quoted the famous passage from Shakespeare’s ‘Measure for Measure’ stating,

“O, it is excellent

To have a gaint’s strength;

but it is tyrannous

To use it like a giant.”

The Indian Supreme Court today is regarded as one of the most powerful courts in the world. This because of its ability to make and enact law, declare it unconstitutional and lastly to create procedures for its own administration in a manner that may not have mention in the Constitution. When the Supreme Court in 1993 held that under the Constitution of India, no appointment of any judge can be made unless it is in conformity with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, it was following the above last example.

One must understand that this whole idea of a collegium and the Supreme Court regulating its own appointments emanates from the phrase ‘independence of the judiciary’. In a host of cases, this principle has been held to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and in what seems to be quite ridiculous, the Court apparently feels that its independence would be taken away if the executive and legislature have a say in appointments, even though the Constitution may require so. Under the garb of this independence, the collegium has been created and justified thus demonstrating its power and showing the President as a mere puppet who is obliged to go by the Chief Justice’s recommendation.

About a little while ago, the President sent back the recommendation of the CJI on the elevations of four judges. This because the President thought that four others had been superceded in the process. However, the CJI sent back the recommendation to the President. According to the Third Judges case, the President is then bound to consider this names and appoint them. More here

The idea of a Collegium has the status of a Constitutional Convention

Constitutional Conventions are uncodified procedural practices that are followed by state authorities as a matter of rule. The idea comes from England where there being no written constitution, functions of government are governed by conventions. In India, this may be applicable to practices developed by Constitutional functionaries where the Constitution is silent on the same. Ivor Jenning’s stated that in order to establish a convention three questions must be asked; 1) what are the precedents, 2)did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by the rule and 3) whether there is a good reason for the rule ?.

Taking this forward, it was largely through Dicey’s influence that the term ‘convention’ has been accepted to describe a constitutional obligation, obedience to which is secured despite the absence of the ordinary means of enforcing the obligation in a Court of law. These obligations arise from customs and practices.

In the First Judges case, Bhagwati J. described the idea of a collegium as a convention but was silent on its enforceability and its binding character. It was only in the Second Judges case that Kuldip Singh J. went on to describe the appointment process as a ‘Healthy Convention’. The court necessarily applied Ivor Jenning’s requirements to show the same.

But then how are Constitutional Conventions enforceable ?

Kuldip Singh J. held that once it is established in a court of law that a convention exists and that the constitutional functionaries are following the same as binding precedents, then there exists no justification to deny such a convention the status of law. what the Court did was to treat constitutional conventions at par with constitutional law and thus binding.

In the Third Judges case, interestingly, the Court did not answer the question as to the process being a convention and thus the ratio of the second judges case stands on this point. The moment one grants the collegiums the status of a convention, we ought to recognize it as a constitutional process being binding on the authorities.

The CJI being a ‘Public Authority’ has grave Implications

In CPIO Supreme Court v. Subhash Agarwal, Ravindra Bhat J. declared that the Chief Justice of India is a public authority under the Right to Information Act. This, going beyond what was required in the case and stating such. See article here

This implications of this are grave in nature.  Not only is the CJI a public authority with respect to declaration of assets but now in all administrative matters. This also includes note taking, judges meetings and activities of the collegium.

CERTAIN FACTS

- Court cases must contain a dispute or a ‘lis’ to have a ratio. Just like Maneka Gandhi’s case, this case too did not have a ‘lis’ as four days before the CJI declared that the assets would be made public. More so, the Delhi High Court went beyond what was mandated and ruled on other questions too thus making the CJI a public authority in other aspects too rather than just the declaration of assets.

- The Third Judges case was based on a reference submitted under Article 143 of the Constitution. References and opinions given by the Court as a result of it are not binding and cannot be considered as under Article 141. However, while the case was being heard this issue was brought up and the Attorney General Soli SOrabjee stated that the government would give an undertaking to accept this opinion as binding.

The Collegium and the RTI Case: Exploring the Link

The Court in the Third judges case held that the collegiums was formed so as to deter the involvement of other public functionaries in the appointment process. While the question was not answered in the third judges case, it was opined in the second judges case that members of the bar may have their say.

Today when members of the Bar have made a representation against Justice Dinakaran’s appointment, I see no legal jusitification as to why the Collegium must consider such representation. This move to consider itself is a step when the collegiums has decided to involve other entities in the appointment process, something not mandated by the third judges case.

To go further, the third judges case mandated that all the members of the collegiums write down notes on the consultations in the course of the appointment process. With the advent of the RTI Act and the Delhi High Court judgment, there is a stark possibility that these notes may be treated as public documents and me made public. It would then become easy for one to know whether the charges against Justice Dinakaran were brought up and considered by the collegium and what each judge thought about the same.

The crucial question then is; if the Court did not intend public entities to participate in the appointment process, doesn’t the current trend against Justice Dinakaran go against it ?

While I am a supporter of judicial accountability, I do see an irony in the current scenario. We have a judicially created process getting the status of a constitutional convention out of a reference and itself made binding by the judiciary. Then we have a statute and a case making the CJI a public authority and the process itself public and thus defeating the purpose for which the convention according to the third judges case was created.

The solution perhaps then lies in a legislation codifying this constitutional convention. This is in line with the recent law commission proposal to review the judges cases and perhaps give more meaning to the language of the Constitution ( the word ‘consultation’ in Art 124 ).

Suggested Readings

1) Lord Cooke of Thorndon, Where Angels Fear to Tread, Supreme But not Infalliable : Essays in Honor of the Supreme Court of India, p. 97.

2) TR Andhyarujina, Issues of Judicial Independence, The Hindu. Available here

3) Sriram Panchu, Make Declaring Judges’ Assets Mandatory for all Further Appointments, The Hindu. Available here