Referring twice to Dick Cheney as “Darth Vader,” ElBaradei told me in an interview that “U.S. policy consisted of two mantras — Iran should not have the knowledge and should not spin one single centrifuge. They kept saying, wait, Iran is not North Korea, it will buckle. That was absolutely a mistake.”
Roger Cohen, NYT
For over a decade, the man has strode the world of nuclear security and non-proliferation like a Colossus. Before his 12-year career as the IAEA’s honcho ends tomorrow, we take a look at his contributions in turbulent times.
Its easy to think that ElBaradei’s defining moments in the IAEA came in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq – while it is true that he was pushed into the limelight during the time, the Director-General has made his impact through a consistent policy of pragmatism in issues otherwise dictated by fear-mongering.
Nuclear non-proliferation, as a concept, has long been considered by the developing world (including India) to be a lop-sided turf, favouring the ‘recognized’ nuclear powers. This attitude, exacerbated by irrational claims and drastic measures (read ‘NPT’) from the West, has often resulted in straining of relationships. More importantly, the debate surrounding nuclearization has been hijacked by the threat of use of arms, as opposed to utility in civilian energy purposes.
ElBaradei, during his tenure as the world’s top nuclear policeman, was able to differentiate between both circumstances. Consequently, he rooted for removal of sanctions against India after Pokhran-II (considered unthinkable by a US-influenced IAEA) and even encouraged the nuclear framework agreement between India and the United States. Conjunctively, he agreed that Pakistan had its energy requirements, but in the light of the A.Qadir network, he would not support an n-deal with Pak until its nuclear installations and security were confirmed.
Prior to the invasion of Iraq, ElBaradei and his predecessor Hans Blix, asserted that US claims of WMD in Saddam’s hands were misplaced, and that the evidence of uranium purchase was not authentic. He strongly condemned the use of force against Iraq, alongwith Kofi Annan, and claimed the subsequent US admission of ‘no WMD’ as a vindication of his own stand. His efforts in non-proliferation were recognized in 2005 when the IAEA was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
ElBaradei has had an excellent insight into the functioning of the so-called ‘rogue’ nuclear states, viz., Iran and N.Korea. On the boiling Iran front, he has always called for negotiations between belligerent parties, and if talks have even considered mooting a plan for uranium exchange, its largely due to his dogged persistence on dialogue. In recognizing the power fluctuation that fall consequent to nuclear capabilities-acquisition, and the dynamics of deterrence, ElBaradei has been a stalwart of the non-proliferation movement. At a crucial juncture in international affairs, his presence and abilities will be missed, when he steps down from the IAEA on 30 November 2009.
