I was in Jammu and Kashmir recently, to witness a two-day dialogue on issues of autonomy, sectarian violence and Indo-Pak relations vis-a-vis the Kashmir Valley. To be naively frank, the complexities on the ground were mind-boggling to me. Ensconced in ivory towers, myths have been created by the self and the other about the situation in the Valley – as I observed discussions between local politicians, academics and social workers, these myths were being demolished, in rapid succession. Needless to say, it was shocking to wake up to the amount of disinformation and ambiguity surrounding one of India’s most troubled and beautiful locations.
The air of confidentiality surrounding the dialogue mandates that I be discrete with the particulars of the same. Consequently, I’ve jotted down a couple of issues which I think are of great contemporaneous relevance to the problems faced by the Kashmiri people.
The most important, is undoubtedly, the question of autonomy. During a sideline conversation that I had with a young Kashmiri friend, he told me the Kashmiri youth were overwhelmingly in support of Azaadi, and if a plebiscite was held, there would be few who would choose to be part of the Indian polity. Yet, the great irony lay in the fact that the same people who wanted Azaadi did not know what to do with it! The political space on Azaadi (and the moderate demand of Autonomy) of the Kashmiri people is filled with confusing discourse of the political parties in the State. How else would you explain the six-odd voluminous reports that have been issued by every major political party in J&K, right from Sheikh Abdullah’s Naya Kashmir to the PDP’s Self-Rule Document?
At the heart of the Kashmir problem, yes, with all of militancy, unrest and dissent, lies the issue of governance. It is so profoundly simple, and yet so complicated that clear solutions have become the distant future. For years, indeed, since the time of Independence, the State has felt the need for free and fair elections. The number of people I met, who exhorted that J&K State Governments were blessed by the Centre rather than its people, is many. Governance has been a tricky issue for the Central Government because Kashmir has had a tortuous history – right from claims of the Instrument of Accession being non-existent, to conspiracy theories as to why the Indian Army did not go after what is now PoK – there are many thorns in the establishment’s path. But in venturing down this dangerous path, one feels, after listening to countless people in Kashmir, that the pulse of the public is yet to be gauged.
What has spawned off a movement for Azaadi and autonomy has now resulted in decades of militancy and unrest. I left for Kashmir a strong Unionist, and remain one, because I believe that there can be no compromise on the territorial integrity of our country. At the same time, it was heart-wrenching to know and hear about the plight of fellow citizens in a far corner, treated and often understood as ‘different’ from the Indian mainstream. Demands of autonomy, I often felt, were justified, if it meant that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had access to better, effective governance. But amidst all the internal turmoil, be it between Jammu, Kashmir, Leh, Kargil or the Chenab Valley, it is important that top priority is accorded to developmental needs of the State. In thrashing out a plan for autonomy, or governance within the federal framework, either through Chidambaram’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ or other modes, its important that the solutions are responsive and reactive.
On the foreign policy front, I do believe that it is time for India to restart negotiations with Pakistan. The latter is in a dire internal situation, and has repeatedly emphasized its willingness to get back to the table. Rather than watching the show unravel in Pakistan, the Indian Government must engage in a composite dialogue on Kashmir. CBMs have shown the way forward, and must be kept in place to further continuity of relationship. Trade and economic relations must improve to benefit J&K, and for once, the hawks must be ignored to take our relations with Pakistan forward.
(The immediate future of Indo-Pak relations will also form the subject of the next post)
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Pakistan has to go for a troop build-up in South Waziristan, if the offensive is to be complete and successful. Any failure, minor or not, is going to be a huge morale loss to the Pak Army/ establishment. For this purpose, the troops stationed along the LoC have to be moved and allocated to S. Waz accordingly. However, that can happen only if there’s some assurance/ semblance of negotiation on the Indian front. Realpolitik mandates that India seize the opportunity to use this leverage against Pakistan at a time when they dont really want to send their LoC troops elsewhere, but have no option. At the same time, the Pakistan Taliban in South Waz poses a huge security threat to India as well. So a negotiation can only result in a win-win situation, i think.
Ref: to last para,
But is it possible to achieve any fruitful negotiation when Pak is ‘in a dire internal situation’