(This article forms the second post in the Teach-Yourself-Indo-China-Relations-Kit series.)
Differences between New Delhi and Beijing have a historical nexus to border disputes and skirmishes spread over half a century. Consequently, any analysis of extant relations is illuminated by the problems that have cropped up along the 4000 km-long Line of Actual control demarcating the Sino-Indian territories.
Indo-China relations started on a good footing after India’s Independence, with the establishment of diplomatic connections and recognition of the Panchsheel principles. While the Indian establishment had been taken aback by the swift and largely unexpected Chinese invasion of Tibet, India’s foreign policy, guided by Nehru, chose to overlook Chinese interests in the region. However, relations soured in later years over disputed claims to Aksai Chin, and India’s asylum to the Dalai Lama, which culminated in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
For decades, the war of 1962 shaped the contours of bilateral relations, marked by frequent skirmishes along the border and cartographic differences vis-à-vis disputed territories. Nonetheless, concessions have been made in recent times, with reference to some areas. During former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Beijing visit, both countries issued a joint statement, acknowledging that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a ‘part of’ the territory of the People’s Republic of China. In response, China agreed to initiate border trade with India through the ‘north-east State’ of Sikkim, and has removed the region from its index of ‘independent nations’ in Asia. The McMahon line continues to present a number of complications, with the Chinese refusing to accept the Simla Accord of 1914. Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North East Frontier Agency, remains a bone of contention between both countries, with India firmly dispelling any Chinese claims to the State. Of late, the Chinese practice of granting stapled paper visas to residents of Kashmir has also generated controversy, drawing strong reactions from the Indian side.
Yet, it is remarkable that China has settled all (land) border differences with twelve of its fourteen neighbours, including ideologically-driven, complicated ones with smaller nations such as Vietnam. The two nations still locked over territorial disputes with China are Bhutan, which has no diplomatic relations with the former, and India. Given the potential benefits vis-à-vis regional stability and economic development that would accrue from a peaceful settlement, it is difficult to gauge why China has not accorded priority to solutions on the Line of Actual Control.
Perhaps, it has. In fact, the delay in boundary settlement has often been viewed as a deliberate tactic, employed by China to exert pressure on Indian influence in the region. If such dispositions were correct, the circle of Sino-Indian relations would have reached a juncture where territorial interests are no longer the primary objective of their mutual foreign policy – rather, it is the geopolitical and strategic concerns that drive border conflicts.
(Continued)
Image courtesy The Hindu.
No related posts.
Related posts brought to you by Yet Another Related Posts Plugin.
Thank you for your comment manav – I’vent debunked China’s claims to Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh – merely stated that they are often a bone of contention. However, I’m not quite sure how you maintain that China was not consulted during the line-drawing process. China was very much a party to the talks that preceded the Simla Accord, though it disagreed with its outcome. Even at that point, Outer Tibet was given an autonomous role beyond Chinese control – therefore the incidents after the invasion of Tibet in the 50s do not warrant China much legitimacy either. Aksai Chin falls within the Tibetan plateau and is admittedly a barren land, pointless to claim. Only the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh falls within the Tibetan Plateau, and therefore you must enlighten me on how Indian claims to the ‘bulk’ of it are tenuous. However, if you are arguing that the entire McMahon line is redundant because its arbitrary, then its a different matter,a situation where neither side has a justifiable claim.
The Sumsurdong incident is one among skirmishes fought in the 60s and the 80s and defined by claim-relics from ’62. Since this is a rather long, divided piece, I’ve tried to be as brief as possible.
Arun, India also has a very tenuous claim over Aksai Chin, and, for that matter, the bulk of Arunachal Pradesh. Lines that were arbitrarily drawn between the Indian Empire and Tibet, at a point when China, which was going through internal stability, was not consulted, doesn’t really make India’s claim legitimate.
And I would think Rajiv’s visit was more important, no? Coming as it did after the Sumsomething Chu incident?