(Concludes the analysis on Indo-China Relations)
Competitiveness stems from both countries being acutely aware of their growing influence in South and East Asia. While China is still ahead in terms of human development indices, economic growth and military capabilities, India is hot on its trail. In fact, many observers have predicted that the Indian economy would overtake China’s in the near future, due to a number of advantages in terms of ‘soft’ infrastructure – transparent corporate governance, a sophisticated intellectual property law regime, and a democratic system founded on the rule of law. In conjunction with the growing economic firepower, strategic influence is also expected to burgeon.
This rivalry has manifested in a number of measures by both countries, to exert their influence in the neighbourhood. China has consistently used its ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan as a wedge against Indian interests in and around Kashmir; Chinese investment in Pakistan has been massive, and range from strategic sea ports in Gwadar (near the Strait of Hormuz) and nuclear reactors in the Punjab region, to development and infrastructure aid in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). India has often expressed its concern towards growing Chinese support for Pakistan’s military ends, especially after the nuclear tests of 1998, and the issue remains a sore point between both countries.
China’s alliance with Pakistan is seen as a part of a larger policy of encirclement, or as some analysts call it, a ‘string of pearls’ strategy (seen in picture) , to curtail India’s influence in South Asia. While the Chinese establishment is quick to deny such expansionist claims, its initiatives from the Strait of Malacca to the Persian Gulf (and across the Indian Ocean) do seem to suggest that the country is trying to spread its geopolitical influence in systematic fashion. China has not only engaged in projects of strategic and developmental importance with countries where it has traditionally held sway, such as Myanmar, but has also ventured to develop stronger relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which have strong connections with India.
Notwithstanding such containment measures, India’s international stature and rising Asian influence has been a cause of concern to China. Having inked landmark nuclear deals with the U.S, France and Russia, India has been accepted into the nuclear fold, despite alleged involvement by China to scuttle a waiver grant from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The 1-2-3 nuclear deal is also part of a larger strategic involvement with the United States, and comes at a time when India has been dehyphenated from Pakistan and is often seen as a buffer state against growing Chinese interests. Although India has no comprehensive policy in place to counter China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy, its influence on neighbours can hardly be measured on the wane. In addition, India’s acknowledged influence and development-oriented partnership with Central Asian economies also reflects the country’s emergence on the global scene.
India has also entered into a number of strategic relationships, seen as measures to mitigate Chinese hegemony in Asia. The Indian Government has been actively pursuing its ‘Look East’ Policy agenda and on this count, has deepened ties with Japan and Australia. India is also constantly improving its commercial relations with the ASEAN and the East Asian Community.
The simmering tension between these two Asian forces on regional, and often, global fronts, has manifested in a number of bilateral ‘incidents’. The argument that China uses border uncertainties as a pressure tactic on India certainly seems compelling in the light of the aforementioned circumstances. Given the conducive nature of a peaceful land border to development on both sides, China’s actions do seem to be directed at a larger motive, and to place its thumb firmly on the pulse of the region. On the other hand, many commentators in India consider Tibet to be a trump card against Chinese intimidation. Besides using the Dalai Lama’s presence in Dharamsala to highlight the country’s firm commitment to human rights, the Indian Government has often been urged to leverage his asylum against China’s constant worry of ethnic protests and social unrest in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regions. Thus, both countries constantly find themselves at loggerheads, creating awkward and sometimes dangerous situations.
Given the high stakes involved in Indo-China relations, it is clear that both nations perceive the futility of any belligerent act. Nonetheless, the air of distrust and rivalry is expected to continue as both these nations power their way through the next few decades.
Image courtesy: Sangam.org
the world’s factory lost their jobs. Nonetheless, as developed economies shrank in various quarters from late 2008 to mid-2009, China grew by an astounding 8.9% – so momentous, that there was talk of quickly reining in the Government’s stimulus packages. China’s strong productivity growth, augmented by a manufacturing sector, had opened up after market reforms in the late seventies, and since then, has not looked back. Despite fears being cast on a regular basis about the collapse of an overheated economy, China has grown by leaps and bounds to be the world’s third largest. Perhaps its impact on the global financial scene can be summed up the fact that nearly half of the U.S. Treasury bonds are held in China, and amounts to trillions of dollars. If China were to pull the plug today, several economies would feel the ground shake beneath their feet.
Indo-China relations started on a good footing after India’s Independence, with the establishment of diplomatic connections and recognition of the Panchsheel principles. While the Indian establishment had been taken aback by the swift and largely unexpected Chinese invasion of Tibet, India’s foreign policy, guided by Nehru, chose to overlook Chinese interests in the region. However, relations soured in later years over disputed claims to Aksai Chin, and India’s asylum to the Dalai Lama, which culminated in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
