In his op-ed on Foreign Policy, Daniel Twining speaks on the significance of considering the US’ relationship with India as a value-based interaction among the world’s largest and most populous democracies. He criticizes the Obama Administration for attempting to engage China in a near zero-sum, interest-based relationship, one that is myopic in nature.
Taking a similar line of argument, it is important to note the relevance of Barry Buzan’s theory of the international security community in this context – classifying regional (and to a limited extent, global) relationships in the spectrum of (1) conflict formation, (2) security regime and (3) international security community. The third phase in the spectrum, as Buzan describes in his book Security: A New Framework For Analysis, is a situation envisaged where the security interests of two or more nations are so intertwined that they cannot be realistically considered apart from one another – basically, a situation of war is inconceivable between them. Take for instance, the EU. The argument then, is that this ’secure’ community is able to facilitate economic and cultural ties between its constituent members.
Where does the U.S-China relationship figure in this scheme? Alan Collins makes an articulate case, using Buzan’s theory, on Sino-US ties – he sees it developing towards a nascent security regime, where the threat of conflict is very real (accounting for a number of factors, including Taiwan and N.Korea) but perhaps not imminent, for the parties’ own interests will then be harmed. The essay does not consider the impact of the global financial crisis (it was written a year before the meltdown) but the credit crunch has only added to Collins’ argument. This is perhaps best exemplified through Obama’s recent visit of China.
China is expected to play a significant role in leading the global economy out of recession, and American interests are heavily reliant on it. The fact of China holding billions of U.S Treasury bonds is well-known, and consequently, the US is extremely cautious about its approach to the Asian giant. Obama, evidently, is keen to appease China to sustain its interests (in the Korean peninsula as well), and this interest-based relationship is not founded on a culture of solidarity. In fact, the situation could not be more contrasting: China’s track record on democratic regimes/reform, human rights and free speech is deplorable, and has often been a cause of concern to the United States. Yet, in prevalent circumstances, the Obama administration can ill-afford to rub China the wrong way on these sensitive issues.
On the other hand, U.S Presidents (till Obama) have treated India as a ‘natural’ partner in South Asia. Democracy is a defining factor that connects India and America, in a way that is a significant buttress to US exhortations in Af-Pak and the Middle East. It is also important in the struggle against extremist activity where India and US get hurt the most. Despite sanctions imposed in the immediate aftermath of Pokhran I and II, the US has recognized India as a responsible nuclear power and has even entered into a civilian nuclear agreement.
Thus, it was not surprising that the US-China joint statement hyphenating India with the India-Pakistan problem created a furore here.
And yet, even if we were to go beyond the value-based relationship, an ideal bedrock of Indo-U.S. ties, America stands to benefit greatly from nursing Indian growth in South Asia. As Twining states, India’s stiff competition to China on economic growth and its involvement in sensitive issues such as Tibet, has greatly worried the latter. Ergo, we have the Arunachal Pradesh ruckus (part of the larger border dispute), paper-stamped visas, joint statements, hawkish press releases and what-have-you.
Admittedly, India needs to go a fair distance to catch up with China. The Chinese, at the moment, present a direct threat to American leverage in Asia-Pacific, even as its Japanese grip seems to be easing with the Hatoyama Government in place. The U.S needs a strategic partner in Asia, that can directly counter the rising Chinese tide, and the answer in plain and obvious. There can be no better rationale for partnership and co-operation with India, than the culture of solidarity that exists (almost subliminally now) between both nations.
In calling for 30,000 more troops, President Barack Obama is solidifying the budding strategic partnership with India and putting Pakistan between a rock and a hard stone. India requires a relatively stable and westernized polity in Afghanistan that will not serve as an Islamic rear base for its rival Pakistan, which is why India has been heavily invested in the government of Hamid Karzai, who previously studied in India. India has opened consulates throughout Afghanistan and was uncomfortable with the barrage of anti-Karzai criticism coming out of Washington. Obama’s decision to add troops will, therefore, bring a sigh of relief to New Delhi. Pakistan’s strategic calculus is dif ferent. The Pakistani military has been willing to show some resolve in battling the Taliban inside Pakistan, but it still sees Karzai as a pro-Indian enemy whom it would like to see undermined, rather than built up as Obama is now intent on doing, even if aid money bypasses him and goes directly to local governments. But since Pakistan gets military aid, including spare parts, from the United States, it cannot openly sabotage Obama’s efforts. Thus will arise the principal tension in Obama’s new policy – and one of the tensions that will help define his presidency – keeping Pakistan on board. The degree to which he can woo Islamabad will directly correlate with the success he hopes to achieve. Both Iran and Russia are conflicted over Afghanistan: they oppose the Sunni Muslim Taliban – Iran is Shia and Russia fears a radicalized Central Asia. But the fact that Obama is now forthright behind a troop surge may cause Tehran and Moscow to make choices, which hopefully will be in A merica’s interests.”
In addition, the advantages in building on extant social welfare measures are many if Web 2.0 is employed. Lets take the instance of using Twitter for an NREGA social audit. Twitter can be effectively employed to publicize the aims and agenda of the social audit (not just to villages, but also in cities and towns), the minutes of the social audit meeting and conclusions from it, and thereby bring larger public participation into the process. True, it requires villages near and remote to have steady internet connections and proper training (through e-literacy programmes) – but it is a heady investment and can reap significant benefits. Twitter is just one example – even Facebook can, say, be used in scheduling a public gathering for an RTI meet or a social audit and to create campaign groups in rural environs as well. YouTube could be a forum to create channels and upload videos of these social audits and meetings. If outsourcing businesses to rural india is the new trend (see a 
