Something About The Law

“At once familiar and little known, the Khyber Pass provides a valuable lens for observing history where empires continue to rise and fall, allowing us to look upon the invaders that marched through it to create kingdoms or to destroy them.“

- Paddy Docherty (2008)

What is The Khyber?

The Khyber is a student-reviewed biweekly newsletter focusing on South Asian policy and regional affairs. The body of the newsletter consists of a collation of news-related op-eds from leading national, regional and international sources. The Khyber was launched to bring oft-neglected policy discussions into mainstream academic discourse, and hopes, like the Pass from which its name is borrowed, to provide easy access for the information-thirsty traveller into this strange, misunderstood, frustrating but important part of the world.

Why?

The goal of encouraging policy discourse comes at a time when Indian Universities are qualitatively deficit (in terms of faculty/experts and research centres) in International Relations and Foreign Policy. The news streams, available (at least) on a biweekly basis on The Khyber, provide much-needed views and insights into contemporaneous affairs in South Asia.

So its basically a compilation – What’s New?

Pretty much everything. In our preparations to create such a collation, we found that no such model for South Asian Affairs exists in India, either at the academic or professional level. We continue to labour under the impression that a JNU could quench the thirst of a up-and-coming generation getting increasingly connected to a global network. MATRIX, the e-journal from the JNU School of International Studies, had its last publication in September 2000. The era of Cold Wars and Ideological Battlefields is passe -nor does Ancient India’s prowess in Foreign Policy excite anyone – rather than generic analyses of antediluvian power structures, the Khyber aims to bring the latest to your attention.

How do we propose to go about it?

Well, the Khyber is designed to be an interactive feature, symbolic of Web 2.0, where your suggestions/findings of an interesting news or op-ed/analysis could be fuel to the newsletter. Consequently, we have  dedicated pages on Facebook and Twitter, and aim to increase its outreach beyond lawschools.

Do subscribe, and contribute.

Our tech-savvy Minister of State for External Affairs seems to have got into a spot of bother again – this time though, its not on Twitter’s turf, but at an event organised by the Association of Indian diplomats and the Indian Council of World Affairs in London. To quote Mr. Tharoor,

“I think his [is a] very clear summary for us of the way in which Indian foreign policy drew from our founding fathers’ sense of our civilisational heritage, the extraordinary contribution of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru to the articulation of that civilisational heritage, the manner in which both enhanced India’s standing in the world and gave us the negative reputation for conducting foreign policy as a sort of moralistic running commentary on other people’s behaviour.”

Quite naturally, the Congress establishment has been taken aback by his comments on a rather hallow issue like Nehruvian Foreign Policy. However, his comments, which supplemented Lord Bikhu Parekh’s, opens the door for a lively debate on whether Independent India’s foreign policy was moral to a fault. The need for such a debate is extremely relevant at a time when our aspirations and commitments at both regional and global levels are rapidly burgeoning.

To be very clear, Tharoor himself has not been critical of the moral angles to Nehruvian policy – as is evident from the quote, he has merely stated that the pursuit of such a policy was a double-edged sword which, apart from its advantages, also generated negative reputation for its moral evaluation of ‘other people’s behaviour’. Undeniably true.  When Indian troops marched to occupy the Portugese colony of Goa in 1961, JFK is reported to have said that atleast now, the US would be spared India’s lectures about a moral foreign policy. Despite all our early commitments to non-alignment, India has had phases of proclivity towards the USSR (during Mrs. Gandhi’s regime) and the U.S (the past 6 – 1o years). Whereas we walked the moral high ground of non-proliferation in the 50s, India exulted after the Buddha smiled at Pokhran in ‘74 and ‘98. Evidently, emerging India has rarely sung to the tune of Pt. Nehru’s sacrosanct policy. Despite breaking free from moral shackles (which some may claim never existed), it is critical to understand whether India’s foreign policy benefited from such a posture in its infancy.

Nehru, who was our PM and EAM for 17 long years, articulated India’s foreign policy along the lines of multilateral cooperation and non-alignment. At a time when colonialism was beginning to witness its sunset, Nehru’s statesmanly approach to international organizations emboldened the voice and stance of developing countries in the same. If we have a G77 today, and if India is still bracketed as a benign leader of the Developing World, it is because of old alliances forged during the formation of the UN and the NAM.

When I was at the United Nations for a summer program last year, I was told of the high regard in which Indian diplomats were considered, not just by developing countries, but the Great Powers as well. Its natural to put this down to the talent of some of the best Foreign Service officers in the world, but it is equally important to recognize that our strong presence in the UN is due to our long-standing and invaluable contribution to multilateral diplomacy – be it in the form of Blue Berets in regions and conflicts where India had absolutely no interests to preserve, or to the cause of democratic reform which we preached endlessly about.

Emerging from the bloodbath of Partition and nationalist violence, it was easy for India to have swung towards the path of militarism and authoritarian rule. Our foreign policy’s moral compass, however, prevented that. While,  like Mr. Tharoor says, we might have come across as a running commentator on third-party affairs, our ‘priesthood’ also resulted in a self-imposed responsibility to maintain internal democracy. True, this has been criticized in instances such as Goa’s annexation and Kashmir’s plebiscite condition, but India’s integrity as a conglomerate of incredible and awe-inspiring diversity needed to be protected at all costs. We could’ve had tanks on our streets for decades, but our commitment to (undeniably) moral aspirations have hitherto resulted in 15 General Elections.

Non-alignment is another realm of Nehruvian FP that has often come under heavy artillery. From the rather convenient outpost of hindsight, its easy to see that NAM has had its own advantages. As a newly-independent country, hungry for resources and aid, it was easy to have turned into a superpower-satellite prior to the Cold War.

Let’s just take a look at what has happened to USSR satellites now. East Germany, North Korea, Poland, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Cuba – the list is rather long, and boasts of several impoverished regions of the world. Of course, the US fought the war with its ‘Allies’ and in as much as it is fashionable to say that we should’ve teamed up with the eventual winner of the Cold War, India was clearly in no position to be an ‘ally’ to the West. At the same time, India would’ve been doomed to obscurity had we just slept over the War. Instead, Nehru rose to the occasion, seizing an opportunity to grab the spotlight on the international stage. Like they say, any publicity is good publicity.

Its true that our morality in foreign affairs was prone to massive hits, even at the slightest opportunity. Kashmir and the issue of plebiscite was a raw wound, open to further international criticism. But it would be rather foolish not to expect a nation-state to preserve its interests at the foremost – the issue of a moral foreign policy was, in fact, central to our interests. (How?) As an emerging nation, it was in our best interests to ally and possibly ‘lead’ a group of developing nations in order to gain leverage on contentious issues such as Kashmir. It was also the best way to subvert any dominance from the extant superpowers that would later influence our trajectory of development.

It would not be unfair to say that we have not led the true potential of this ‘moral’ foreign policy to its logical conclusion. Nehru’s final years marked the beginning of our isolationism in world politics, and for years we basked in the non-existent sunshine of values, when millions starved. Now we have the opportunity to redeem ourselves, but will the proverbial Elephant in the room squeeze out the others?

(Concludes the analysis on Indo-China Relations)

Competitiveness stems from both countries being acutely aware of their growing influence in South and East Asia. While China is still ahead in terms of human development indices, economic growth and military capabilities, India is hot on its trail. In fact, many observers have predicted that the Indian economy would overtake China’s in the near future, due to a number of advantages in terms of ‘soft’ infrastructure – transparent corporate governance, a sophisticated intellectual property law regime, and a democratic system founded on the rule of law. In conjunction with the growing economic firepower, strategic influence is also expected to burgeon.

This rivalry has manifested in a number of measures by both countries, to exert their influence in the neighbourhood. China has consistently used its ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan as a wedge against Indian interests in and around Kashmir; Chinese investment in Pakistan has been massive, and range from strategic sea ports in Gwadar (near the Strait of Hormuz) and nuclear reactors in the Punjab region, to development and infrastructure aid in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). India has often expressed its concern towards growing Chinese support for Pakistan’s military ends, especially after the nuclear tests of 1998, and the issue remains a sore point between both countries.

China’s alliance with Pakistan is seen as a part of a larger policy of encirclement, or as some analysts call it, a ‘string of pearls’ strategy (seen in picture) , to curtail India’s influence in South Asia. While the Chinese establishment is quick to deny such expansionist claims, its initiatives from the Strait of Malacca to the Persian Gulf (and across the Indian Ocean) do seem to suggest that the country is trying to spread its geopolitical influence in systematic fashion. China has not only engaged in projects of strategic and developmental importance with countries where it has traditionally held sway, such as Myanmar, but has also ventured to develop stronger relations with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which have strong connections with India.

Notwithstanding such containment measures, India’s international stature and rising Asian influence has been a cause of concern to China. Having inked landmark nuclear deals with the U.S, France and Russia, India has been accepted into the nuclear fold, despite alleged involvement by China to scuttle a waiver grant from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The 1-2-3 nuclear deal is also part of a larger strategic involvement with the United States, and comes at a time when India has been dehyphenated from Pakistan and is often seen as a buffer state against growing Chinese interests. Although India has no comprehensive policy in place to counter China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy, its influence on neighbours can hardly be measured on the wane. In addition, India’s acknowledged influence and development-oriented partnership with Central Asian economies also reflects the country’s emergence on the global scene.

India has also entered into a number of strategic relationships, seen as measures to mitigate Chinese hegemony in Asia. The Indian Government has been actively pursuing its ‘Look East’ Policy agenda and on this count, has deepened ties with Japan and Australia. India is also constantly improving its commercial relations with the ASEAN and the East Asian Community.

The simmering tension between these two Asian forces on regional, and often, global fronts, has manifested in a number of bilateral ‘incidents’. The argument that China uses border uncertainties as a pressure tactic on India certainly seems compelling in the light of the aforementioned circumstances. Given the conducive nature of a peaceful land border to development on both sides, China’s actions do seem to be directed at a larger motive, and to place its thumb firmly on the pulse of the region. On the other hand, many commentators in India consider Tibet to be a trump card against Chinese intimidation. Besides using the Dalai Lama’s presence in Dharamsala to highlight the country’s firm commitment to human rights, the Indian Government has often been urged to leverage his asylum against China’s constant worry of ethnic protests and social unrest in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Regions. Thus, both countries constantly find themselves at loggerheads, creating awkward and sometimes dangerous situations.

Given the high stakes involved in Indo-China relations, it is clear that both nations perceive the futility of any belligerent act. Nonetheless, the air of distrust and rivalry is expected to continue as both these nations power their way through the next few decades.

Image courtesy: Sangam.org

(The third and penultimate post on Indo-China relations)

India and China: ‘Rivals in Partnership’

To determine the accuracy of such a conclusion, it is important to observe the growing influence of Indian and China in terms of economic growth and geostrategic, regional clout. These instances are indicative of the intense rivalry and competition that exists among these emerging nations, even as they continue to foster their economic relations through boosting of trade volume.

The Economy

While the West struggled to cope with a devastating financial crisis, China’s economy showed little signs of slowing down. To be fair, the Chinese were affected by the crisis as export demand slowed down, and legions of workers in the world’s factory lost their jobs. Nonetheless, as developed economies shrank in various quarters from late 2008 to mid-2009, China grew by an astounding 8.9% – so momentous, that there was talk of quickly reining in the Government’s stimulus packages. China’s strong productivity growth, augmented by a manufacturing sector, had opened up after market reforms in the late seventies, and since then, has not looked back. Despite fears being cast on a regular basis about the collapse of an overheated economy, China has grown by leaps and bounds to be the world’s third largest. Perhaps its impact on the global financial scene can be summed up the fact that nearly half of the U.S. Treasury bonds are held in China, and amounts to trillions of dollars. If China were to pull the plug today, several economies would feel the ground shake beneath their feet.

However, the Chinese dragon faces stiff competition from the Indian tiger – the impact of the credit crunch was mitigated by the conservative banking system in India, and the country’s diverse public sector. Arguably, India’s services-run economy fared better than China, as the latter’s heavy reliance on export demand and foreign investment fell by a considerable margin. Notwithstanding a high rate of unemployment and significant swathes of population living below poverty line, it is certain that the Indian economy will be a force to reckon with in the years to come.

(To be continued..)

Image courtesy Chinadaily.com

(This article forms the second post in the Teach-Yourself-Indo-China-Relations-Kit series.)

Differences between New Delhi and Beijing have a historical nexus to border disputes and skirmishes spread over half a century. Consequently, any analysis of extant relations is illuminated by the problems that have cropped up along the 4000 km-long Line of Actual control demarcating the Sino-Indian territories.

Indo-China relations started on a good footing after India’s Independence, with the establishment of diplomatic connections and recognition of the Panchsheel principles. While the Indian establishment had been taken aback by the swift and largely unexpected Chinese invasion of Tibet, India’s foreign policy, guided by Nehru, chose to overlook Chinese interests in the region. However, relations soured in later years over disputed claims to Aksai Chin, and India’s asylum to the Dalai Lama, which culminated in the Sino-Indian war of 1962.

For decades, the war of 1962 shaped the contours of bilateral relations, marked by frequent skirmishes along the border and cartographic differences vis-à-vis disputed territories.  Nonetheless, concessions have been made in recent times, with reference to some areas. During former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Beijing visit, both countries issued a joint statement, acknowledging that the Tibet Autonomous Region is a ‘part of’ the territory of the People’s Republic of China. In response, China agreed to initiate border trade with India through the ‘north-east State’ of Sikkim, and has removed the region from its index of ‘independent nations’ in Asia. The McMahon line continues to present a number of complications, with the Chinese refusing to accept the Simla Accord of 1914. Arunachal Pradesh, formerly the North East Frontier Agency, remains a bone of contention between both countries, with India firmly dispelling any Chinese claims to the State. Of late, the Chinese practice of granting stapled paper visas to residents of Kashmir has also generated controversy, drawing strong reactions from the Indian side.

Yet, it is remarkable that China has settled all (land) border differences with twelve of its fourteen neighbours, including ideologically-driven, complicated ones with smaller nations such as Vietnam. The two nations still locked over territorial disputes with China are Bhutan, which has no diplomatic relations with the former, and India. Given the potential benefits vis-à-vis regional stability and economic development that would accrue from a peaceful settlement, it is difficult to gauge why China has not accorded priority to solutions on the Line of Actual Control.

Perhaps, it has. In fact, the delay in boundary settlement has often been viewed as a deliberate tactic, employed by China to exert pressure on Indian influence in the region. If such dispositions were correct, the circle of Sino-Indian relations would have reached a juncture where territorial interests are no longer the primary objective of their mutual foreign policy – rather, it is the geopolitical and strategic concerns that drive border conflicts.

(Continued)

Image courtesy The Hindu.